На бирже курсовых и дипломных проектов можно найти образцы готовых работ или получить помощь в написании уникальных курсовых работ, дипломов, лабораторных работ, контрольных работ, диссертаций, рефератов. Так же вы мажете самостоятельно повысить уникальность своей работы для прохождения проверки на плагиат всего за несколько минут.

ЛИЧНЫЙ КАБИНЕТ 

 

Здравствуйте гость!

 

Логин:

Пароль:

 

Запомнить

 

 

Забыли пароль? Регистрация

Повышение уникальности

Предлагаем нашим посетителям воспользоваться бесплатным программным обеспечением «StudentHelp», которое позволит вам всего за несколько минут, выполнить повышение уникальности любого файла в формате MS Word. После такого повышения уникальности, ваша работа легко пройдете проверку в системах антиплагиат вуз, antiplagiat.ru, etxt.ru или advego.ru. Программа «StudentHelp» работает по уникальной технологии и при повышении уникальности не вставляет в текст скрытых символов, и даже если препод скопирует текст в блокнот – не увидит ни каких отличий от текста в Word файле.

Результат поиска


Наименование:


курсовая работа The World Trade Organization

Информация:

Тип работы: курсовая работа. Добавлен: 17.08.2012. Сдан: 2011. Страниц: 22. Уникальность по antiplagiat.ru: < 30%

Описание (план):


ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ АГЕНТСТВО ПО ОБРАЗОВАНИЮ 
СТАВРОПОЛЬСКИЙ  ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ
Экономический факультет 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

КУРСОВАЯ РАБОТА
на тему: «The World Trade Organization»
(www.wto.org) 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Выполнила: студентка 4 курса ЭФ
специальности «мировая экономика» группы А
Безладная Виктория Дмитриевна 
 
 
 

Научный руководитель:
к.п.н., доцент Симонова Н.А. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Ставрополь 2009 

Содержание
    Стиль текста 3
      Характер  текста 3
        Лексическая характеристика 4
        Грамматический  уровень 4
        Синтаксический  уровень 4
    Способы перевода 5
      Сокращенный способ 5
        Выборочный  перевод 5
        Функциональный  перевод 6
      Полный  перевод 6
        Буквальный  перевод 6
        Семантический перевод 6
    Переводческие трансформации 7
      Грамматические  трансформации 7
      Стилистические  трансформации 7
    Исходный  текст 8
    Текст перевода 38
 

     
     1 Стиль текста
     1.1 Характер официально-делового текста
     Современный литературный язык характеризуется  определенными нормами в орфоэпии, лексике, грамматике и стилистике. Языковые нормы являются обязательными. Единство литературного языка создается благодаря общелитературным, или межстилевым, средствам, которые могут употребляться в разных языковых стилях. Стилистически нейтральная лексика не имеет особого выражения, а стилистически окрашенная лексика – наоборот, имеет (разговорное, просторечное, специальное, книжное и.т.п.) В свою очередь, язык подразделяется на функциональные стили. В зависимости от задач речи стили делятся на разговорный и книжный (научный, официально-деловой, публицистический, стиль научной литературы).
     Приведенный ниже текст написан в официально-деловом стиле. Официально-деловой стиль – функциональный стиль речи, среда речевого общения в сфере официальных отношений, в сфере правовых отношений и управления. Эта сфера охватывает международные отношения, к данной сфере и относится данный текст, он отражает все стороны, регламентирующие деятельность основной международной торговой организации, Всемирной торговой организации (ВТО). Среди других функциональных стилей, официально-деловой отличается относительной устойчивостью, в целом он имеет консервативный характер. Его одна из главных черт – наличие фраз – клише. Основной сферой функционирования официально-делового стиля, является административно-правовая сфера. В данном тексте говорится о системе ВТО. Текст отличается наличием названий экономического характера (Bretton Woods Conference, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), фраз – клише (TRIMS, TPIPS, most-favored nation, customs duty), невыразительностью речи. Кроме того, текст написан с целью ознакомления читателя с организацией и ее функционированием. 

     1.1.1 Лексическая характеристика
     Данный текст характерен нейтральной лексикой (economy, international, trade, organization), специальными терминами (international economic cooperation, stimulate economic growth, benefit), так как он является международным официальным документом.
      
     1.1.2 Грамматический уровень
     Грамматические особенности текста - это причастия, деепричастия, отглагольные существительные (incoming, determined, selling, established). Часто используются существительные в форме единственного числа в значении множественного (nation, which incoming in the WTO, member of the WTO etc). 

     1.1.3 Синтаксический уровень
     Наиболее часто в тексте используется прямой порядок слов в предложении. В односоставных предложениях преобладают глагольные формы множественного числа, используются слова состояния (obviously, however и др.), предположим, рассмотрим и т. д. В основном используются сложные конструкции (Therefore, both Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya of Columbia University have criticized the introduction of TRIP’s into the WTO framework, fearing that such non-trade agendas might overwhelm the organization's function, The Third World Network has called the WTO "the most non-transparent of international organizations", because "the vast majority of developing countries have very little real say in the WTO system"). Текст характеризуется точностью, строгой логичностью, четкостью изложения. Полностью отсутствует образность и эмоциональность речи.
 

      2 Способы перевода
     Выполняя   перевод,  переводчик определяет способ  перевода, меру информационной упорядоченности для переводимого текста. Первая ступень в выборе способа упорядоченности заключается в определении того, в каком  виде должен быть  представлен текст перевода в переводческой культуре:   полностью или частично.  В зависимости от  коммуникативного задания выбираются полный или сокращенный (реферативный перевод). 

     2.1. Сокращенный способ
     Сокращенному переводу могут подлежать практически все формы текстов – от простого делового письма до романа. Результатом применения сокращенного перевода являются такие тексты, как: тезисы, конспекты, рефераты, аннотации, приложения. Всякий раз размеры такого текста и его образ зависят от способа, который выбирается переводчиком для достижения цели. В сущности, сокращенный перевод выполняется одним из двух способов: выборочный и функциональный перевод. 

     2.1.1 Выборочный перевод
       Выборочный перевод – состоит в выборе ключевых единиц исходного текста и их полном переводе. Все остальные компоненты текста отбрасываются   и   не   подлежат   переводу   вообще.  Такой  способ   перевода довольно часто применяется для пересказа в тезисно-реферативной форме научных статей, докладов и.т.д. Достоверность такого перевода основывается на точности выбора ключевых единиц, чтобы в переводе не пропала какая-либо важная часть исходной информации.
     Например: «The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time. – Соглашение ВТО по торговым аспектам защиты интеллектуальной собственности заключено в 1986-94 гг. в начале Уругвайского раунда». 

     2.1.2 Функциональный перевод
     Функциональный  перевод - компонование переводимого текста и функционально-преобразованных единиц исходного текста. Может существовать лексическая, грамматическая и стилистическая трансформация исходного   текста,   применяемая   в   целях   его   общего   сокращения. В тексте наиболее часто применяются лексические трансформации исходного текста (транслитерация в сочетании с транскрипцией «TRIMS, TRIPS, Bretton Woods system»). 

     2.2 Полный перевод
     2.2.1 Буквальный перевод
     Буквальный  перевод – воспроизведение в  переводном тексте формальных и семантических  компонентов исходного текста. В результате буквального перевода нарушаются нормы и узус языка перевода, оказывается искаженным или непереданным действительное содержание оригинала.
     Например: «Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference – both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions…» Герри Декстер Вайт и Джон Мейнард Кейнс на Бреттон-Вуддской конференции оба экономиста строго защищали свободу международной торговой среды и рекомендовали основать три института… 

     2.2.2 Семантический перевод
     Семантический перевод – перевод текста, как  целого, с учетом смысла каждой единицы, входящей в него. Например «Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to liberalize trade» - если страны используют выраженные торговые барьеры, имеют желание их снизить, переговоры помогают либерализировать торговлю. 

     3 Переводческие трансформации
     3.1 Грамматические трансформации
      Грамматическая трансформация – прием перевода, заключающийся в изменении структуры предложения или словосочетания при сохранении семантической информации (The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО) является единственной глобальной международной организацией, регулирующей правила торговли между нациями). 

      3.2 Стилистические трансформации
      Стилистические  трансформации – изменение стилистической окраски отрезка текста. Например, Steve Charnovitz, former director of the Global Environment and Trade Study (GETS), believes that the WTO "should begin to address the link between trade and labor and environmental concerns." Стив Шарновиц, экс-директор Института исследования глобальной окружающей среды и Торговли (ИИГОСИТ), полагает, что ВТО "должна начать рассматривать связь между торговлей и трудовыми и экологическими проблемами."  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

      4 Исходный текст
     The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business. Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:
     It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.
     It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
     Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation and training. The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.
      ITO and GATT 1947. Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes at the Bretton Woods Conference – both economists had been strong advocates of a liberal international trade environment, and recommended the establishment of three institutions: the IMF (fiscal and monetary issues), the World Bank (financial and structural issues), and the ITO (international economic cooperation). The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic cooperation - notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade, named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the United States and a few other signatories and never went into effect. In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years "transform itself" into a de facto international organization.
      Criticism of WTO. Protestors clashing with Hong Kong police in Wan Chai (area of waterfront) during the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference of 2005. The stated aim of the WTO is to promote free trade and stimulate economic growth. Critics argue that free trade leads to a divergence instead of convergence of income levels within rich and poor countries (the rich get richer and the poor get poorer). Martin Khor, Director of the Third World Network, argues that the WTO does not manage the global economy impartially, but in its operation has a systematic bias toward rich countries and multinational corporations, harming smaller countries which have less negotiation power. He argues that developing countries have not benefited from the WTO agreements of the Uruguay Round because, among other reasons, market access in industry has not improved; these countries have had no gains yet from the phasing-out of textile quotas; non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping measures have increased; and domestic support and export subsidies for agricultural products in the rich countries remain high. Jagdish Bhagwati asserts, however, that there is greater tariff protection on manufacturers in the poor countries, which are also overtaking the rich nations in the number of anti-dumping filings. Other critics claim that the issues of labor relations and environment are steadfastly ignored. Steve Charnovitz, former director of the Global Environment and Trade Study (GETS), believes that the WTO "should begin to address the link between trade and labor and environmental concerns."  Further, labor unions condemn the labor rights record of developing countries, arguing that, to the extent the WTO succeeds at promoting globalization, the environment and labor rights suffer in equal measure. On the other side, Khor responds that "if environment and labor were to enter the WTO system [...] it would be conceptually difficult to argue why other social and cultural issues should also not enter." Bhagwati is also critical towards "rich-country lobbies seeking on imposing their unrelated agendas on trade agreements." Therefore, both Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya of Columbia University, have criticized the introduction of TRIPs into the WTO framework, fearing that such non-trade agendas might overwhelm the organization's function. Other critics have characterized the decision making in the WTO as complicated, ineffective, unrepresentative and non-inclusive, and they have proposed the establishment of a small, informal steering committee (a "consultative board") that can be delegated responsibility for developing consensus on trade issues among the member countries. The Third World Network has called the WTO "the most non-transparent of international organizations", because "the vast majority of developing countries have very little real say in the WTO system"; the Network stresses that "civil society groups and institutions must be given genuine opportunities to express their views and to influence the outcome of policies and decisions." Certain non-governmental organizations, such as the World Federalist Movement, argue that democratic participation in the WTO could be enhanced through the creation of a parliamentary assembly, although other analysts have characterized this proposal as ineffective.
     Some libertarians and small-government conservatives, as well as think tanks such as the Ludwig von Mises Institute, oppose the World Trade Organization, seeing it as a bureaucratic and anti-capitalistic organization not promoting free trade, but political interventionism. The chairman of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Llewellyn H Rockwell Jr, argued that. . . the World Trade Organization says that the US must stop permitting US exporters to set up foreign subsidiaries that save as much as 30 percent in taxes they would otherwise pay. Now the US must either raise taxes by eliminating loopholes or face massive new sanctions that will seriously harm our export sector. [...] There's been a lot of talk recently about foreigners who hate our prosperity and civilization, and seek ways to inflict violence in retaliation. Well, here's another case in point, except these are not swarthy Islamic terrorists; they are diplomats and statesmen on nobody's list of suspicious characters.
     Principles of the trading system. The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy games. Five principles are of particular importance in understanding both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
     Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favoured nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members, i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members. "Grant someone a special favour and you have to do the same for all other WTO members." National treatment means that imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally (at least after the foreign goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against imported goods).
     Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will materialise.
     Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish "ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
     Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The WTO system tries also to improve predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports.
     Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction: articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons. Exceptions to the MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developing countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions. There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body has its own chairman and only ten members. The body also has several groups relating to textiles.
     Above all, it’s a negotiating forum … Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments go, to try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other. The first step is to talk. The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations. The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986-94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the “Doha Development Agenda” launched in 2001.
     Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to liberalize trade. But the WTO is not just about liberalizing trade, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers — for example to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease.
     It’s a set of rules … At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground-rules for international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business, while allowing governments to meet social and environmental objectives.
     The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side-effects — because this is important for economic development and well-being. That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be “transparent” and predictable.
     And it helps to settle disputes … This is a third important side to the WTO’s work. Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written into the WTO agreements. The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the system. (The second WTO ministerial meeting, held in Geneva in May 1998, included a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the system.)
     It did not take long for the General Agreement to give birth to an unofficial, de facto international organization, also known informally as GATT. Over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of negotiations.
     The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO’s creation. Whereas GATT had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now cover trade in services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property).
     Principles of the trading system
     The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. They deal with: agriculture, textiles and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system.
     A closer look at these principles:
     1. Most-favoured-nation (MFN): treating other people equally under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members.
     This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment (see box). It is so important that it is the first article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), although in each agreement the principle is handled slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main areas of trade handled by the WTO.
     Some exceptions are allowed. For example, countries can set up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods traded within the group —   discriminating against goods from outside. Or they can give developing countries special access to their markets. Or a country can raise barriers against products that are considered to be traded unfairly from specific countries. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. But the agreements only permit these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or strong.
     2. National treatment: Treating foreigners and locals equally imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. The same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and patents. This principle of “national treatment” (giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals) is also found in all the three main WTO agreements, although once again the principle is handled slightly differently in each of these.
     National treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of national treatment even if locally-produced products are not charged an equivalent tax. 
     Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade. The barriers concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively. From time to time other issues such as red tape and exchange rate policies have also been discussed.
     Since GATT’s creation in 1947-48 there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. A ninth round, under the Doha Development Agenda, is now underway. At first these focused on lowering tariffs (customs duties) on imported goods. As a result of the negotiations, by the mid-1990s industrial countries’ tariff rates on industrial goods had fallen steadily to less than 4%.
     But by the 1980s, the negotiations had expanded to cover non-tariff barriers on goods, and to the new areas such as services and intellectual property.
     Opening markets can be beneficial, but it also requires adjustment. The WTO agreements allow countries to introduce changes gradually, through “progressive liberalization”. Developing countries are usually given longer to fulfil their obligations. 
     Sometimes, promising not to raise a trade barrier can be as important as lowering one, because the promise gives businesses a clearer view of their future opportunities. With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged, jobs are created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition — choice and lower prices. The multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business environment stable and predictable.
     In the WTO, when countries agree to open their markets for goods or services, they “bind” their commitments. For goods, these bindings amount to ceilings on customs tariff rates. Sometimes countries tax imports at rates that are lower than the bound rates. Frequently this is the case in developing countries. In developed countries the rates actually charged and the bound rates tend to be the same.
     A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. One of the achievements of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks was to increase the amount of trade under binding commitments (see table). In agriculture, 100% of products now have bound tariffs. The result of all this: a substantially higher degree of market security for traders and investors.
     The system tries to improve predictability and stability in other ways as well. One way is to discourage the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities of imports — administering quotas can lead to more red-tape and accusations of unfair play. Another is to make countries’ trade rules as clear and public (“transparent”) as possible. Many WTO agreements require governments to disclose their policies and practices publicly within the country or by notifying the WTO. The regular surveillance of national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a further means of encouraging transparency both domestically and at the multilateral level. 
     The WTO is sometimes described as a “free trade” institution, but that is not entirely accurate. The system does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of protection. More accurately, it is a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition.
     The rules on non-discrimination — MFN and national treatment — are designed to secure fair conditions of trade. So too are those on dumping (exporting at below cost to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues are complex, and the rules try to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by charging additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade.
     Many of the other WTO agreements aim to support fair competition: in agriculture, intellectual property, services, for example. The agreement on government procurement (a “plurilateral” agreement because it is signed by only a few WTO members) extends competition rules to purchases by thousands of government entities in many countries. And so on. 
     The WTO system contributes to development. On the other hand, developing countries need flexibility in the time they take to implement the system’s agreements. And the agreements themselves inherit the earlier provisions of GATT that allow for special assistance and trade concessions for developing countries.
     Over three quarters of WTO members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies. During the seven and a half years of the Uruguay Round, over 60 of these countries implemented trade liberalization programmes autonomously. At the same time, developing countries and transition economies were much more active and influential in the Uruguay Round negotiations than in any previous round, and they are even more so in the current Doha Development Agenda.
     At the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries were prepared to take on most of the obligations that are required of developed countries. But the agreements did give them transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions — particularly so for the poorest, “least-developed” countries. A ministerial decision adopted at the end of the round says better-off countries should accelerate implementing market access commitments on goods exported by the least-developed countries, and it seeks increased technical assistance for them. More recently, developed countries have started to allow duty-free and quota-free imports for almost all products from least-developed countries. On all of this, the WTO and its members are still going through a learning process. The current Doha Development Agenda includes developing countries’ concerns about the difficulties they face in implementing the Uruguay Round agreements.
     The case for open trade
     The economic case for an open trading system based on multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on commercial common sense. But it is also supported by evidence: the experience of world trade and economic growth since the Second World War. Tariffs on industrial products have fallen steeply and now average less than 5% in industrial countries. During the first 25 years after the war, world economic growth averaged about 5% per year, a high rate that was partly the result of lower trade barriers. World trade grew even faster, averaging about 8% during the period.
     The data show a definite statistical link between freer trade and economic growth. Economic theory points to strong reasons for the link. All countries, including the poorest, have assets — human, industrial, natural, financial — which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete overseas. Economics tells us that we can benefit when these goods and services are traded. Simply put, the principle of “comparative advantage” says that countries prosper first by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best, and then by trading these products for products that other countries produce best.
     In other words, liberal trade policies — policies that allow the unrestricted flow of goods and services — sharpen competition, motivate innovation and breed success. They multiply the rewards that result from producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price.
     But success in trade is not static. The ability to compete well in particular products can shift from company to company when the market changes or new technologies make cheaper and better products possible. Producers are encouraged to adapt gradually and in a relatively painless way. They can focus on new products, find a new “niche” in their current area or expand into new areas.
     Experience shows that competitiveness can also shift between whole countries. A country that may have enjoyed an advantage because of lower labour costs or because it had good supplies of some natural resources, could also become uncompetitive in some goods or services as its economy develops. However, with the stimulus of an open economy, the country can move on to become competitive in some other goods or services. This is normally a gradual process.
     Nevertheless, the temptation to ward off the challenge of competitive imports is always present. And richer governments are more likely to yield to the siren call of protectionism, for short term political gain — through subsidies, complicated red tape, and hiding behind legitimate policy objectives such as environmental preservation or consumer protection as an excuse to protect producers.
     Protection ultimately leads to bloated, inefficient producers supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products. In the end, factories close and jobs are lost despite the protection and subsidies. If other governments around the world pursue the same policies, markets contract and world economic activity is reduced. One of the objectives that governments bring to WTO negotiations is to prevent such a self-defeating and destructive drift into protectionism.
     TRUE AND NON-TRIVIAL?
     Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson was once challenged by the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam to “name me one proposition in all of the social sciences which is both true and non-trivial.”
     Samuelson’s answer? Comparative advantage.
     “That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them.”
     This is arguably the single most powerful insight into economics.
     Suppose country A is better than country B at making automobiles, and country B is better than country A at making bread. It is obvious (the academics would say “trivial”) that both would benefit if A specialized in automobiles, B specialized in bread and they traded their products. That is a case of absolute advantage.
     But what if a country is bad at making everything? Will trade drive all producers out of business? The answer, according to Ricardo, is no. The reason is the principle of comparative advantage.
     It says, countries A and B still stand to benefit from trading with each other even if A is better than B at making everything. If A is much more superior at making automobiles and only slightly superior at making bread, then A should still invest resources in what it does best — producing automobiles — and export the product to B. B should still invest in what it does best — making bread — and export that product to A, even if it is not as efficient as A. Both would still benefit from the trade. A country does not have to be best at anything to gain from trade. That is comparative advantage.
     The theory dates back to classical economist David Ricardo. It is one of the most widely accepted among economists. It is also one of the most misunderstood among non-economists because it is confused with absolute advantage.
     It is often claimed, for example, that some countries have no comparative advantage in anything. That is virtually impossible.
     The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh
     The WTO’s creation on 1 January 1995 marked the biggest reform of international trade since after the Second World War. It also brought to reality — in an updated form — the failed attempt in 1948 to create an International Trade Organization.
     Much of the history of those 47 years was written in Geneva. But it also traces a journey that spanned the continents, from that hesitant start in 1948 in Havana (Cuba), via Annecy (France), Torquay (UK), Tokyo (Japan), Punta del Este (Uruguay), Montreal (Canada), Brussels (Belgium) and finally to Marrakesh (Morocco) in 1994. During that period, the trading system came under GATT, salvaged from the aborted attempt to create the ITO. GATT helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading system that became more and more liberal through rounds of trade negotiations. But by the 1980s the system needed a thorough overhaul. This led to the Uruguay Round, and ultimately to the WTO.
     From 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided the rules for much of world trade and presided over periods that saw some of the highest growth rates in international commerce. It seemed well-established, but throughout those 47 years, it was a provisional agreement and organization.
     The original intention was to create a third institution to handle the trade side of international economic cooperation, joining the two “Bretton Woods” institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Over 50 countries participated in negotiations to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) as a specialized agency of the United Nations. The draft ITO Charter was ambitious. It extended beyond world trade disciplines, to include rules on employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment, and services. The aim was to create the ITO at a UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba in 1947.
     Meanwhile, 15 countries had begun talks in December 1945 to reduce and bind customs tariffs. With the Second World War only recently ended, they wanted to give an early boost to trade liberalization, and to begin to correct the legacy of protectionist measures which remained in place from the early 1930s.
     This first round of negotiations resulted in a package of trade rules and 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s total. The group had expanded to 23 by the time the deal was signed on 30 October 1947. The tariff concessions came into effect by 30 June 1948 through a “Protocol of Provisional Application”. And so the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was born, with 23 founding members (officially “contracting parties”).
     The 23 were also part of the larger group negotiating the ITO Charter. One of the provisions of GATT says that they should accept some of the trade rules of the draft. This, they believed, should be done swiftly and “provisionally” in order to protect the value of the tariff concessions they had negotiated. They spelt out how they envisaged the relationship between GATT and the ITO Charter, but they also allowed for the possibility that the ITO might not be created. They were right.
     The Havana conference began on 21 November 1947, less than a month after GATT was signed. The ITO Charter was finally agreed in Havana in March 1948, but ratification in some national legislatures proved impossible. The most serious opposition was in the US Congress, even though the US government had been one of the driving forces. In 1950, the United States government announced that it would not seek Congressional ratification of the Havana Charter, and the ITO was effectively dead. So, the GATT became the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was established in 1995.
     For almost half a century, the GATT’s basic legal principles remained much as they were in 1948. There were additions in the form of a section on development added in the 1960s and “plurilateral” agreements (i.e. with voluntary membership) in the 1970s, and efforts to reduce tariffs further continued. Much of this was achieved through a series of multilateral negotiations known as “trade rounds” — the biggest leaps forward in international trade liberalization have come through these rounds which were held under GATT’s auspices.
     In the early years, the GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs, and to improve the system. The eighth, the Uruguay Round of 1986-94, was the last and most extensive of all. It led to the WTO and a new set of agreements.
     The trade chiefs
     The Directors-general of GATT and WTO 
· Sir Eric Wyndham-White (UK) 1948-68 
· Olivier Long (Switzerland) 1968-80 
· Arthur Dunkel (Switzerland) 1980-93 
· Peter Sutherland (Ireland) GATT 1993-94; WTO 1995 
· Renato Ruggiero (Italy) 1995-1999 
· Mike Moore (New Zealand) 1999-2002 
· Supachai Panitchpakdi (Thailand) 2002-2005 
· Pascal Lamy (France) 2005–our days.

     GATT trade rounds
Year Place/name Subjects covered Countries
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26
1960-1961 Geneva 
Dillon Round
Tariffs 26
1964-1967 Geneva 
Kennedy Round
Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62
1973-1979 Geneva 
Tokyo Round
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, “framework” 
agreements
102
1986-1994 Geneva 
Uruguay Round
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO, etc 123
     The Tokyo Round: a first try to reform the system
     The Tokyo Round lasted from 1973 to 1979, with 102 countries participating. It continued GATT’s efforts to progressively reduce tariffs. The results included an average one-third cut in customs duties in the world’s nine major industrial markets, bringing the average tariff on industrial products down to 4.7%. The tariff reductions, phased in over a period of eight years, involved an element of “harmonization” — the higher the tariff, the larger the cut, proportionally.
     In other issues, the Tokyo Round had mixed results. It failed to come to grips with the fundamental problems affecting farm trade and also stopped short of providing a modified agreement on “safeguards” (emergency import measures). Nevertheless, a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers did emerge from the negotiations, in some cases interpreting existing GATT rules, in others breaking entirely new ground. In most cases, only a relatively small number of (mainly industrialized) GATT members subscribed to these agreements and arrangements. Because they were not accepted by the full GATT membership, they were often informally called “codes”.
     They were not multilateral, but they were a beginning. Several codes were eventually amended in the Uruguay Round and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four remained “plurilateral” — those on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy products. In 1997 WTO members agreed to terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.  
     GATT was provisional with a limited field of action, but its success over 47 years in promoting and securing the liberalization of much of world trade is incontestable. Continual reductions in tariffs alone helped spur very high rates of world trade growth during the 1950s and 1960s — around 8% a year on average. And the momentum of trade liberalization helped ensure that trade growth consistently out-paced production growth throughout the GATT era, a measure of countries’ increasing ability to trade with each other and to reap the benefits of trade. The rush of new members during the Uruguay Round demonstrated that the multilateral trading system was recognized as an anchor for development and an instrument of economic and trade reform.
     But all was not well. As time passed new problems arose. The Tokyo Round in the 1970s was an attempt to tackle some of these but its achievements were limited. This was a sign of difficult times to come.
     GATT’s success in reducing tariffs to such a low level, combined with a series of economic recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s, drove governments to devise other forms of protection for sectors facing increased foreign competition. High rates of unemployment and constant factory closures led governments in Western Europe and North America to seek bilateral market-sharing arrangements with competitors and to embark on a subsidies race to maintain their holds on agricultural trade. Both these changes undermined GATT’s credibility and effectiveness.
     The problem was not just a deteriorating trade policy environment. By the early 1980s the General Agreement was clearly no longer as relevant to the realities of world trade as it had been in the 1940s. For a start, world trade had become far more complex and important than 40 years before: the globalization of the world economy was underway, trade in services — not covered by GATT rules — was of major interest to more and more countries, and international investment had expanded. The expansion of services trade was also closely tied to further increases in world merchandise trade. In other respects, GATT had been found wanting. For instance, in agriculture, loopholes in the multilateral system were heavily exploited, and efforts at liberalizing agricultural trade met with little success. In the textiles and clothing sector, an exception to GATT’s normal disciplines was negotiated in the 1960s and early 1970s, leading to the Multifibre Arrangement. Even GATT’s institutional structure and its dispute settlement system were causing concern.
     These and other factors convinced GATT members that a new effort to reinforce and extend the multilateral system should be attempted. That effort resulted in the Uruguay Round, the Marrakesh Declaration, and the creation of the WTO.
     The Uruguay Round
     It took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. By the end, 123 countries were taking part. It covered almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history.
     At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes transparent around the world. 
     The seeds of the Uruguay Round were sown in November 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the ministers intended to launch a major new negotiation, the conference stalled on agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme that the ministers agreed formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.
     Nevertheless, it took four more years of exploring, clarifying issues and painstaking consensus-building, before ministers agreed to launch the new round. They did so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. They eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATT articles were up for review. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed, and the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.
     Two years later, in December 1988, ministers met again in Montreal, Canada, for what was supposed to be an assessment of progress at the round’s half-way point. The purpose was to clarify the agenda for the remaining two years, but the talks ended in a deadlock that was not resolved until officials met more quietly in Geneva the following April.
     Despite the difficulty, during the Montreal meeting, ministers did agree a package of early results. These included some concessions on market access for tropical products — aimed at assisting developing countries — as well as a streamlined dispute settlement system, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism which provided for the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members. The round was supposed to end when ministers met once more in Brussels, in December 1990. But they disagreed on how to reform agricultural trade and decided to extend the talks. The Uruguay Round entered its bleakest period.
     Despite the poor political outlook, a considerable amount of technical work continued, leading to the first draft of a final legal agreement. This draft “Final Act” was compiled by the then GATT director-general, Arthur Dunkel, who chaired the negotiations at officials’ level. It was put on the table in Geneva in December 1991. The text fulfilled every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with one exception — it did not contain the participating countries’ lists of commitments for cutting import duties and opening their services markets. The draft became the basis for the final agreement.
     Over the following two years, the negotiations lurched between impending failure, to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. New points of major conflict emerged to join agriculture: services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation of a new institution. Differences between the United States and European Union became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.
     In November 1992, the US and EU settled most of their differences on agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House accord”. By July 1993 the “Quad” (US, EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations on tariffs and related subjects (“market access”). It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded (although some final touches were completed in talks on market access a few weeks later). On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.
     The delay had some merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 1990: for example some aspects of services and intellectual property, and the creation of the WTO itself. But the task had been immense, and negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world. The difficulty of reaching agreement on a complete package containing almost the entire range of current trade issues led some to conclude that a negotiation on this scale would never again be possible. Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly calling for a new round early in the next century. The response was mixed; but the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.
     The WTO replaced GATT as an international organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Trade lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994. Confusing? For most of us, it’s enough to refer simply to “GATT”. 
     Many of the Uruguay Round agreements set timetables for future work. Part of this “built-in agenda” started almost immediately. In some areas, it included new or further negotiations. In other areas, it included assessments or reviews of the situation at specified times. Some negotiations were quickly completed, notably in basic telecommunications, financial services. (Member governments also swiftly agreed a deal for freer trade in information technology products, an issue outside the “built-in agenda”.)
     The agenda originally built into the Uruguay Round agreements has seen additions and modifications. A number of items are now part of the Doha Agenda, some of them updated.
     There were well over 30 items in the original built-in agenda. This is a selection of highlights:
     1996 Maritime services: market access negotiations to end (30 June 1996, suspended to 2000, now part of Doha Development Agenda)
     Services and environment: deadline for working party report (ministerial conference, December 1996)
     Government procurement of services: negotiations start
     1997 Basic telecoms: negotiations end (15 February)
     Financial services: negotiations end (30 December)
     Intellectual property, creating a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
     1998 Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
     Services (emergency safeguards): results of negotiations on emergency safeguards to take effect (by 1 January 1998, deadline now March 2004)
     Rules of origin: Work programme on harmonization of rules of origin to be completed (20 July 1998)
     Government procurement: further negotiations start, for improving rules and procedures (by end of 1998)
     Dispute settlement: full review of rules and procedures (to start by end of 1998)
     1999 Intellectual property: certain exceptions to patentability and protection of plant varieties: review starts
     2000 Agriculture: negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
     Services: new round of negotiations start, now part of Doha Development Agenda
     Tariff bindings: review of definition of “principle supplier” having negotiating rights under GATT Art 28 on modifying bindings
     Intellectual property: first of two-yearly reviews of the implementation of the agreement
     2002 Textiles and clothing: new phase begins 1 January
     2005 Textiles and clothing: full integration into GATT and agreement expires 1 January
     The 15 original Uruguay Round subjects
     Tariffs 
Non-tariff barriers 
Natural resource products 
Textiles and clothing 
Agriculture 
Tropical products 
GATT articles 
Tokyo Round codes 
Anti-dumping 
Subsidies 
Intellectual property 
Investment measures 
Dispute settlement 
The GATT system 
Services.

     Abbreviations
     Some of the abbreviations and acronyms used in the WTO:
     ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (Lome Convention and Cotonu Agreement) AD, A-D Anti-dumping measures AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AMS Aggregate measurement of support (agriculture) APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CCC (former) Customs Co-operation Council (now WCO) CER [Australia New Zealand] Closer Economic Relations [Trade Agreement] (also ANCERTA) COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CTD Committee on Trade and Development CTE Committee on Trade and Environment CVD Countervailing duty (subsidies) DDA Doha Development Agenda DSB Dispute Settlement Body DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding EC European Communities EFTA European Free Trade Association EU European Union (officially European Communities in WTO) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GSP Generalized System of Preferences HS Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System ICITO Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund ITC International Trade Centre ITO International Trade Organization MEA Multilateral environmental agreement MERCOSUR Southern Common Market MFA Multifibre Arrangement (replaced by ATC) MFN Most-favoured-nation MTN Multilateral trade negotiations NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement PSE Producer subsidy equivalent (agriculture) PSI Pre-shipment inspection S&D, SDT Special and differential treatment (for developing countries) SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SDR Special Drawing Rights (IMF) SELA Latin American Economic System SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary measures TBT Technical barriers to trade TMB Textiles Monitoring Body TNC Trade Negotiations Committee TPRB Trade Policy Review Body TPRM Trade Policy Review Mechanism TRIMs Trade-related investment measures TRIPS Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights UN United Nations UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development UNDP UN Development Programme UNEP UN Environment Programme UPOV International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants UR Uruguay Round VER Voluntary export restraint VRA Voluntary restraint agreement WCO World Customs Organization WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization WTO World Trade Organization
         Overview: a navigational guide
     The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual countries’ commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require governments to make their trade policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted, and through regular reports by the secretariat on countries’ trade policies.
     These agreements are often called the WTO’s trade rules, and the WTO is often described as “rules-based”, a system based on rules. But it’s important to remember that the rules are actually agreements that governments negotiated.
     This chapter focuses on the Uruguay Round agreements, which are the basis of the present WTO system. Additional work is also now underway in the WTO. This is the result of decisions taken at Ministerial Conferences, in particular the meeting in Doha, November 2001, when new negotiations and other work were launched. (More on the Doha Agenda, later.)
     The table of contents of “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts” is a daunting list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings. In fact, the agreements fall into a simple structure with six main parts: an umbrella agreement (the Agreement Establishing the WTO); agreements for each of the three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods, services and intellectual property); dispute settlement; and reviews of governments’ trade policies.
     The agreements for the two largest areas — goods and services — share a common three-part outline, even though the detail is sometimes quite different. 
     They start with broad principles: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (for goods), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). (The third area, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), also falls into this category although at present it has no additional parts.)
     Curbing anti-competitive licensing contracts
     The owner of a copyright, patent or other form of intellectual property right can issue a licence for someone else to produce or copy the protected trademark, work, invention, design, etc. The agreement recognizes that the terms of a licensing contract could restrict competition or impede technology transfer. It says that under certain conditions, governments have the right to take action to prevent anti-competitive licensing that abuses intellectual property rights. It also says governments must be prepared to consult each other on controlling anti-competitive licensing.
     Having intellectual property laws is not enough. They have to be enforced. This is covered in Part 3 of TRIPS. The agreement says governments have to ensure that intellectual property rights can be enforced under their laws, and that the penalties for infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The procedures must be fair and equitable, and not unnecessarily complicated or costly. They should not entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. People involved should be able to ask a court to review an administrative decision or to appeal a lower court’s ruling.
     The agreement describes in some detail how enforcement should be handled, including rules for obtaining evidence, provisional measures, injunctions, damages and other penalties. It says courts should have the right, under certain conditions, to order the disposal or destruction of pirated or counterfeit goods. Wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale should be criminal offences. Governments should make sure that intellectual property rights owners can receive the assistance of customs authorities to prevent imports of counterfeit and pirated goods.
     Developing countries in particular, see technology transfer as part of the bargain in which they have agreed to protect intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement includes a number of provisions on this. For example, it requires developed countries’ governments to provide incentives for their companies to transfer technology to least-developed countries.
     When the WTO agreements took effect on 1 January 1995, developed countries were given one year to ensure that their laws and practices conform with the TRIPS agreement. Developing countries and (under certain conditions) transition economies were given five years, until 2000. Least-developed countries have 11 years, until 2006 — now extended to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents.
     If a developing country did not provide product patent protection in a particular area of technology when the TRIPS Agreement came into force (1 January 1995), it had up to 10 years to introduce the protection. But for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, the country had to accept the filing of patent applications from the beginning of the transitional period, though the patent did not need to be granted until the end of this period. If the government allowed the relevant pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical to be marketed during the transition period, it had to — subject to certain conditions — provide an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent was granted, whichever was shorter.
     Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that obligations in the agreement apply to intellectual property rights that existed at the end of a country’s transition period as well as to new ones.
     Non-tariff barriers: red tape, etc
     A number of agreements deal with various bureaucratic or legal issues that could involve hindrances to trade.
   import licensing 
rules for the valuation of goods at customs 
preshipment inspection: further checks on imports 
rules of origin: made in ... where? 
investment measures
     Although less widely used now than in the past, import licensing systems are subject to disciplines in the WTO. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures says import licensing should be simple, transparent and predictable. For example, the agreement requires governments to publish sufficient information for traders to know how and why the licences are granted. It also describes how countries should notify the WTO when they introduce new import licensing procedures or change existing procedures. The agreement offers guidance on how governments should assess applications for licences.
     Some licences are issued automatically if certain conditions are met. The agreement sets criteria for automatic licensing so that the procedures used do not restrict trade.
     Other licences are not issued automatically. Here, the agreement tries to minimize the importers’ burden in applying for licences, so that the administrative work does not in itself restrict or distort imports. The agreement says the agencies handling licensing should not normally take more than 30 days to deal with an application — 60 days when all applications are considered at the same time.
     For importers, the process of estimating the value of a product at customs presents problems that can be just as serious as the actual duty rate charged. The WTO agreement on customs valuation aims for a fair, uniform and neutral system for the valuation of goods for customs purposes — a system that conforms to commercial realities, and which outlaws the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The agreement provides a set of valuation rules, expanding and giving greater precision to the provisions on customs valuation in the original GATT.
     The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement applies only to measures that affect trade in goods. It recognizes that certain measures can restrict and distort trade, and states that no member shall apply any measure that discriminates against foreigners or foreign products (i.e. violates “national treatment” principles in GATT). It also outlaws investment measures that lead to restrictions in quantities (violating another principle in GATT). An illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these GATT articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content requirements”). It also discourages measures which limit a company’s imports or set targets for the company to export (“trade balancing requirements”).
     Under the agreement, countries must inform fellow-members through the WTO of all investment measures that do not conform with the agreement. Developed countries had to eliminate these in two years (by the end of 1996); developing countries had five years (to the end of 1999); and least-developed countries seven. In July 2001, the Goods Council agreed to extend this transition period for a number of requesting developing countries.
     The agreement establishes a Committee on TRIMs to monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also says that WTO members should consider, by 1 January 2000, whether there should also be provisions on investment policy and competition policy. This discussion is now part of the Doha Development Agenda.
     The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time.
     Ideas and knowledge are an increasingly important part of trade. Most of the value of new medicines and other high technology products lies in the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved. Films, music recordings, books, computer software and on-line services are bought and sold because of the information and creativity they contain, not usually because of the plastic, metal or paper used to make them. Many products that used to be traded as low-technology goods or commodities now contain a higher proportion of invention and design in their value — for example brandnamed clothing or new varieties of plants.
     Creators can be given the right to prevent others from using their inventions, designs or other creations — and to use that right to negotiate payment in return for others using them. These are “intellectual property rights”. They take a number of forms. For example books, paintings and films come under copyright; inventions can be patented; brandnames and product logos can be registered as trademarks; and so on. Governments and parliaments have given creators these rights as an incentive to produce ideas that will benefit society as a whole.
     The extent of protection and enforcement of these rights varied widely around the world; and as intellectual property became more important in trade, these differences became a source of tension in international economic relations. New internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual property rights were seen as a way to introduce more order and predictability, and for disputes to be settled more systematically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

      5 Текст перевода
     Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО) является единственной глобальной международной организацией, регулирующей правила торговли между  нациями. В основе ее деятельности лежат  соглашения ВТО, заключенные и подписанные  большей частью стран - участниц мировой торговли и ратифицированные в парламентах этих стран. Цель организации состоит в содействии производителям товаров и услуг, экспортерам, и импортерам вести бизнес. Среди различных функций ВТО следующие выделяются аналитиками, как наиболее важные:
        1. Наблюдение за ведением, управлением  и исполнением заключенных соглашений.
     2. Обеспечение условий для переговоров  и урегулирование споров.
     3. Также, обязанностью ВТО является  рассмотрение и внедрение национальной  торговой политики, гарантирование ее последовательности и прозрачности, путем наблюдения за глобальной экономической средой, и  выработке тактики. Приоритет ВТО - помощь развитию отсталым странам и странам с низким доходом в переходном периоде приспособиться к правилам ВТО и дисциплинам путем технического сотрудничества и обучения. ВТО - также центр экономического исследования и анализа: регулярные оценки глобальной торговой конъюнктуры в ее ежегодных публикациях и отчетах о научно-исследовательской работе по определенным темам реализуются организацией. Наконец, ВТО близко сотрудничает с двумя другими институтами Бреттон-Вуддской системы, Международным Валютным Фондом и группой Всемирного банка.
       МЭС (международное экономическое  сотрудничество) и ГАТТ 1947. Гарри  Декстер Уайт и Джон Мейнард Кейнс на Бреттон-Вуддской Конференции (оба экономиста вступали в защиту мировой либерализации),  рекомендовали учредить следующие институты: Международный валютный фонд (финансовый и денежно-кредитный институт), Всемирный банк (финансовый и структурный институт), и МЭК (международное экономическое сотрудничество). Предшественник ВТО, Генеральное соглашение по тарифам и торговле (ГАТТ), был основан после Второй мировой войны вслед за другими новыми многосторонними учреждениями, посвященными международному экономическому сотрудничеству, - учреждениями Бреттон-Вуддской системы, известными как Всемирный банк и Международный валютный фонд. Также была достигнута договоренность о создании международного учреждения торговли – Международная торговая организация. Международная торговая организация должна была существовать как специализированное агентство в рамках Организации Объединенных Наций, регулирующая не только торговые барьеры, но и другие проблемы, косвенно связанные с торговлей, включая занятость населения, инвестиции, практику деловых отношений, и товарные соглашения. Создание МТО не было одобрено Соединенными Штатами и некоторыми другими странами, и никогда не вступало в силу. В отсутствие международной организации по торговле ГАТТ за эти годы "преобразовало бы себя" в фактически действующую международную организацию.
       Критика ВТО. Столкновение протестующих  с Гонконгской полицией в Ван  Чай (побережье) во время Министерской  Конференции Всемирной торговой  организации в 2005 году. Цель ВТО  состоит в обеспечении свободной торговли и стимулировании экономического роста. Критики утверждают, что свободная торговля приводит к расхождению в уровнях доходов богатых и бедных стран (богатые становятся более богатыми, а бедные становятся более бедными). Мартин Кнор, Директор сотрудничества стран Третьего мира, утверждает, что ВТО не управляет мировой экономикой беспристрастно, в ее деятельности имеет  место систематический уклон к богатым странам и многонациональным корпорациям при проведении переговоров, что, в свою очередь, вредит менее развитым странам, у которых имеется малое количество голосов. Он утверждает, что развивающиеся страны не извлекли выгоду из соглашений ВТО Уругвайского раунда, потому что, например, доступ к рынку промышленности не улучшился; эти страны не получили никакой прибыли согласно соглашению о текстильных долях; нетарифные барьеры, такие как антидемпинговые меры возросли; внутренняя поддержка и экспортные субсидии для сельскохозяйственных продуктов в богатых странах остаются высокими. Джадиж Бавати утверждает, однако, что существует тарифная защита производителей в бедных странах, с которой сталкиваются богатые страны в случае применения антидемпинговых процедур. Другие критики утверждают, что проблемы трудовых отношений и окружающей среды никаким образом не регулируются в рамках ВТО. Стив Шарновиц, экс- директор Института исследования глобальной окружающей среды и Торговли (ИИГОСИТ), полагает, что ВТО "должна начать рассматривать связь между торговлей и трудовыми и экологическими проблемами." Профсоюзы осуждают качество трудовых прав развивающихся стран, утверждая, что, ВТО преуспевает при продвижении глобализации, но в то же время окружающая среда и трудовые права страдают в равной мере. С другой стороны, Кор отвечает, что, "если бы окружающая среда и рабочая сила должны были войти в систему содействия ВТО [...], было бы концептуально трудно спорить, почему другие социальные и культурные проблемы не должны также войти в ее компетенцию.". Бавати считает "лоббирование богатыми странами,  при рассмотрении ими внеторговых повесток дня по торговым соглашениям." Таким образом, и Бавати, и Арвин Панагария из Университета Колумбии, критиковали введение ТРИПС в структуру ВТО, боясь, что такие неторговые повестки дня могли бы навредить выполнению главной функции организации. Другие критики характеризовали принятие решений в ВТО как сложный, неэффективный, нетипичный процесс, поэтому они предложили учреждение небольшого, неофициального руководящего комитета ("консультативное управление"), который может обладать делегированной ответственностью за урегулирование отношений по торговым проблемам среди государств - членов. Сотрудническтво стран Третьего мира назвало ВТО "самой непрозрачной из международных организаций", потому что "большинство развивающихся стран имеет небольшое право голоса в системе ВТО"; также они подчеркивают, что «гражданское общество» обязано давать группам и учреждениям подлинные возможности выразить их взгляды и повлиять на результат политики и решений." Некоторые неправительственные организации, такие как Мировое Федералистское Движение, утверждают, что демократическое участие в ВТО могло быть реализовано через создание парламентского собрания, хотя другие аналитики характеризовали это предложение как неэффективное.
     Некоторые сторонники либерализации и мелко-правительственные консерваторы, так же как мозговые центры, например, Институт Ludwig von Mises, выступают против Всемирной торговой организации, демонстрируя что это бюрократическая и антикапиталистическая организация, не продвигающая свободную торговлю, а своего рода политический интервенционизм. Председатель Института Ludwig von Mises, Левелин Роквелл Младший, утверждал что «Всемирная торговая организация считает, что США должны прекратить разрешать американским экспортерам основывать иностранные филиалы, которые экономят целых 30 процентов налогов, которые они должны уплачивать. Таким образом, США должны или поднять налоги, устраняя так называемые «дыры» в законе,  или оказаться перед массивными новыми санкциями, которые будут серьезно вредить экспортному сектору.» [...] Недавно состоялись переговоры об иностранцах, которым не нравится наши благосостояние и цивилизация, они ищут способы нанести вред этому. Вот другой показательный пример, кроме них существуют Исламские террористы; они - дипломаты и государственные деятели, у которых нет подозрительных характеристик.
     Принципы  торговой системы. ВТО устанавливает  структуру торговой политики. Таким  образом, ВТО заинтересовано в установлении правил торговых игр политики. Следующие пять принципов имеют особое значение в понимании и предназначении ГАТТ и ВТО:
     Недискриминация. Данный принцип имеет два главных  компонента: страна наибольшего благоприятствования, как правило, и национальная политика. Они вложены в главные правила  ВТО о товарах, услугах, и интеллектуальной собственности, но их точное значение отличаются в этих областях. Правило НБН (наибольшего благоприятствования) требует, чтобы участник ВТО применил одинаковые условия для торговли со всеми участниками ВТО, то есть участник ВТО должен предоставить благоприятные условия, при которых можно осуществлять торговлю данным продуктом со всеми участниками ВТО. "Предоставьте кому-то наиболее выгодные условия, и Вы должны будете сделать то же самое для всех других участников ВТО. " Национальная обработка означает, что импортированные и произведенные для внутреннего рынка товары нужно рассматривать одинаково (по крайней мере после того, как иностранные товары вышли на рынок); введение нетарифных барьеров (например технические стандарты, стандарты безопасности и др., предвзято относящиеся к импортированным товарам).
     Взаимность. Отражает обоюдное желание торговцев  ограничить область торговли, которое  может возникнуть из-за правила MFN (НБН), и желания получить больший доступ к иностранным рынкам. Важный пункт –при проведении переговоров стране необходимо получить выгоду от выполнения торговых операций, так, чем больше выгода, доступная от одностороннего соглашения; тем больше гарантия, что взаимная договоренность принесет еще большую прибыль.
     Закрепление и осуществление обязательства. Тарифные обязательства, определенные участниками ВТО путем многосторонних торговых переговоров, перечислены  в списке концессий. Эти списки устанавливают "ceiling bindings": страна может изменить свой лимит, но только после ведения переговоров с ее торговыми партнерами. Если соглашение не получено, страна может подать жалобу и воспользоваться процедурой урегулирования спора в структуре ВТО.
и т.д.................


Перейти к полному тексту работы


Скачать работу с онлайн повышением уникальности до 90% по antiplagiat.ru, etxt.ru или advego.ru


Смотреть полный текст работы бесплатно


Смотреть похожие работы


* Примечание. Уникальность работы указана на дату публикации, текущее значение может отличаться от указанного.